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How	We	Think	and	Act	Together	
Shannon	Spaulding	
	
Forthcoming	in	Philosophical	Psychology,	special	issue	on	Collective	
Intentionality	and	Socially	Extended	Minds,	edited	by	Mattia	Gallotti	and	
Bryce	Huebner.	Please	cite	only	the	final	version.		
1.	Introduction		Every	morning	when	I	wake	up,	I	walk	into	the	kitchen	and	make	myself	a	cup	of	coffee.	The	typical	folk	psychological	explanation	of	this	behavior	will	make	reference	to	my	beliefs,	desires,	and	intentions.	For	instance,	I	believe	that	there	is	coffee	in	the	kitchen,	I	desire	to	drink	coffee,	and	I	intend	to	go	to	the	kitchen	to	make	coffee	for	myself.	The	typical	scientific	explanation	of	this	behavior	will	involve	neuroscientific	facts	about	how	my	brain	operates.	For	example,	information	is	sent	from	frontal	lobe	to	the	premotor	cortex	and	then	to	various	muscles,	which	generate	and	control	my	movements.	Both	the	folk	psychological	and	scientific	explanations	of	my	thinking	and	behavior	focus	on	facts	about	me.	These	are	
individualistic	explanations.	Most	mainstream	explanations	of	cognition	and	action	tend	to	be	individualistic	in	this	way.			This	pattern	of	individualistic	explanations	holds	even	for	social	cognition	and	social	behavior.	Mainstream	accounts	of	how	we	think	and	act	with	other	people	tend	to	focus	on	individuals’	mental	states	and	cognitive	mechanisms.	Suppose	we	are	making	coffee	together.	An	individualistic	explanation	of	this	social	interaction	will	focus	on	each	individual’s	mental	states	(e.g.,	my	intentions,	my	beliefs	about	your	intentions,	and	perhaps	even	my	beliefs	about	what	you	think	my	intentions	are)	and	individual’s	cognitive	mechanisms	(e.g.,	how	in	my	brain	information	is	sent	from	the	frontal	lobe	and	the	left	temporal	parietal	junction	to	the	premotor	cortex	and	then	to	my	muscles).			Individualistic	explanations	of	social	cognition	and	behavior	are	natural,	especially	when	seen	as	an	extension	of	how	most	philosophers	and	cognitive	scientists	typically	explain	cognition	and	behavior	in	general.	However,	they	are	not	the	only	game	in	town.	Some	philosophers	and	cognitive	scientists	argue	for	what	I	call	
collectivist	explanations	of	cognition	and	behavior.	Collectivist	explanations	primarily	focus	on	relational	facts,	i.e.,	facts	about	the	relations	between	an	individual	and	her	environment	rather	than	just	facts	about	individuals.	These	explanations	shift	the	unit	of	analysis	from	the	individual	to	relations	between	the	individual	and	the	world.			Various	views	fall	into	the	collectivist	category,	e.g.,	embedded,	embodied,	extended,	and	enactive	cognition.	These	views	aim	to	supplement	or	overthrow	(depending	on	the	radicalness	of	the	argument)	individualistic	explanations	of	cognition	and	
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behavior.	Collectivist	accounts	of	cognition	and	behavior	focus	on	the	ways	in	which	our	environment	influences	how	we	think	and	act,	how	our	bodies	shape	our	cognition	and	behavior,	the	coupling	between	our	own	minds	and	external	things	and	events,	and	complex	interactions	across	individuals,	objects,	and	events.	In	their	application	to	social	cognition	and	behavior,	collectivist	views	emphasize	the	importance	of	individuals’	environments,	bodies,	and	other	individuals	in	our	social	interactions.			My	interest	in	this	paper	is	social	cognition,	so	I	will	focus	primarily	on	individualistic	and	collectivist	explanations	of	how	we	think	and	act	together.	I	shall	argue	that	individualistic	explanations	neglect	phenomena	important	to	social	cognition	that	are	properly	emphasized	by	collectivists.	Although	I	do	not	think	the	evidence	or	arguments	warrant	replacing	individualistic	explanations	of	social	cognition	with	collectivist	explanations,	I	shall	argue	that	we	have	good	reason	to	supplement	our	individualistic	accounts	so	as	to	include	the	ways	in	which	situational	context	affect	social	interactions.	The	result,	I	hope,	is	a	more	sophisticated	individualism	that	offers	a	more	comprehensive	account	of	how	we	think	and	act	together.			
2.	Individualistic	and	Collectivist	Accounts	of	Social	Cognition		Social	cognition	is	our	capacity	to	understand	and	interact	with	other	agents.	Theorizing	about	social	cognition	tends	to	start	with	the	question,	How	does	one	understand	what	others	are	thinking,	feeling,	and	doing	and	anticipate	what	they	will	think,	feel,	and	do	next?	Given	this	framing,	accounts	of	social	cognition	tend	to	focus	on	the	cognitive	processes	of	an	individual	subject.	In	particular,	the	debates	about	how	we	understand	others	often	focus	on	the	type	and	content	of	a	subject’s	mental	representations	in	a	social	interaction.		Consider,	for	example,	the	debate	between	the	Theory	Theory	(TT)	and	the	Simulation	Theory	(ST).	The	TT	holds	that	we	explain	and	predict	behavior	by	employing	a	tacit	folk	psychological	theory	about	how	mental	states	inform	behavior	(Carruthers	&	Smith,	1996;	Davies	&	Stone,	1995a;	Nichols	&	Stich,	2003).	This	folk	psychological	theory	is	a	rich	body	of	information	about	how	mental	states	relate	to	other	mental	states	and	to	behavior.	According	to	this	view,	with	our	folk	psychological	theory,	we	infer	from	a	target’s	behavior	what	his	or	her	mental	states	probably	are,	and	thereby	explain	the	behavior.	From	these	inferences,	plus	the	psychological	principles	in	the	theory	connecting	mental	states	to	behavior,	we	predict	the	target’s	behavior.			The	ST,	in	contrast,	holds	that	we	explain	and	predict	a	target’s	behavior	by	using	our	own	minds	as	a	simulation	of	the	other	person’s	mind	(Currie	&	Ravenscroft,	2002;	Davies	&	Stone,	1995b;	Gordon,	1992;	Heal,	1998).	To	explain	a	target’s	behavior,	we	put	ourselves	in	another’s	shoes,	so	to	speak,	and	imagine	what	our	mental	states	would	be	and	how	we	would	behave	if	we	were	the	target	in	that	
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particular	situation.	To	predict	a	target’s	behavior,	we	take	the	attributed	mental	states	as	input	and	simulate	the	target’s	decision	about	what	to	do	next.1		Although	TT	and	ST	disagree	about	many	important	aspects	of	social	cognition,	they	share	the	individualistic	starting	point.	Their	investigations	are	framed	by	questions	about	what	is	happening	in	an	individual	subject’s	mind.	The	simulation	theorist	posits	that	the	subject	runs	through	a	mental	simulation	of	a	target,	whereas	the	theory	theorist	holds	that	the	subject	employs	a	rich	body	of	information	to	come	up	with	a	theoretical	inference	about	the	target.	Both	TT	and	ST	appeal	to	a	subject’s	mental	representations	to	explain	how	we	think	and	act	together.		The	TT/ST	debate	is	just	one	illustration	of	the	individualistic	theme	in	social	cognition	research.	Other	examples	include	debates	about	how	children	develop	mental	state	concepts	(Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009;	Onishi	&	Baillargeon,	2005;	Perner	&	Ruffman,	2005;	Rakoczy,	2012),	whether	understanding	others’	thoughts	and	behaviors	requires	introspection	(Goldman,	2006,	p.	187;	Gordon,	1995),	and	the	mental	representations	required	to	engage	in	and	recognize	in	others	pretense,	sarcasm,	irony,	and	deception,	(Nichols	&	Stich,	2003,	pp.	16-59).	Each	of	these	discussions	aims	to	explain	the	mental	representations	of	an	individual	subject	as	a	way	of	explaining	how	we	think	and	act	together.		Though	the	individualistic	theme	is	common,	it	is	not	universal.	Collectivist	accounts	reject	the	individualist	starting	point	for	social	cognition	research.	As	I	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	various	views	fall	under	the	category	of	collectivism.	These	include	embedded	cognition,	which	focuses	on	how	the	environments	we	inhabit	shape	our	cognition	(Aydede	&	Robbins,	2009),	embodied	cognition,	which	focuses	the	way	in	which	our	bodies	and	environments	influence	and	perhaps	constitute	cognition	(Shapiro,	2010),	extended	cognition,	which	focuses	on	how	dynamic	interactions	amongst	agents	and	things	can	constitute	cognition	that	extends	beyond	the	brain	and	body	(Menary,	2010),	and	enactive	cognition,	which	focuses	on	how	the	dynamic	interaction	between	an	agent	and	her	environment	constitutes	cognition	(Stewart,	Gapenne,	&	Di	Paolo,	2010).	This	is	not	the	place	for	an	extended	review	of	these	accounts	of	cognition.2	Instead,	I	shall	describe	one	central	example	to	illustrate	the	difference	between	individualism	and	collectivism.		Embodied	cognition	represents	one	kind	of	collectivist	challenge	to	individualism.	Embodied	cognition	objects	to	cognitivism,	the	standard	view	in	cognitive																																																									1	In	addition	to	what	we	might	call	pure	TT	and	pure	ST	are	hybrid	accounts	that	incorporate	elements	of	both	TT	and	ST.		Hybrid	accounts	aim	to	capture	the	theoretical	advantages	of	ST	and	TT	while	avoiding	the	problems	with	both	theories.	For	example,	Shaun	Nichols	and	Stephen	Stich	(2003)	have	developed	a	TT-centric	hybrid	account,	and	Alvin	Goldman	(2006)	has	developed	a	ST-centric	hybrid	account.		2	See	Shapiro	(2014)	for	a	nice	collection	of	papers	on	the	strengths,	weaknesses,	and	applications	of	4-E	cognition.		
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psychology.	Cognitivism	holds	that	our	cognitive	capacities	should	be	understood	in	terms	of	computational	procedures	operating	on	symbolic,	internal	mental	states,	and	thus	cognitive	science	should	be	focused	on	studying	these	internal	states	and	processes.	Embodied	cognition	holds	that	cognitivism	makes	the	mistake	of	emphasizing	the	mind	as	something	to	be	studied	independently	of	the	body	and	its	environment.	According	to	embodied	cognition,	the	emphasis	in	cognitive	science	should	be	on	how	the	body	and	the	environment	shape	the	mind.			With	respect	to	social	cognition,	embodied	cognition	proponents	reject	both	TT	and	ST	accounts	of	how	we	understand	and	interact	with	others.	They	argue	against	the	idea	that	social	cognition	is	based	on	an	individual	ascribing	mental	states	to	other	agents.	On	the	embodied	cognition	account,	the	capacity	for	more	basic,	non-mentalistic,	interactive	embodied	practices	underlies	our	ability	to	understand	and	interact	with	others.	These	embodied	practices	are	constituted	by	“primary	intersubjectivity”	and	“secondary	intersubjectivity.”			Primary	intersubjectivity	is	“the	innate	or	early	developing	capacity	to	interact	with	others	manifested	at	the	level	of	perceptual	experience	–	we	see	or	more	generally	perceive	in	the	other	person’s	bodily	movements,	facial	gestures,	eye	direction,	and	so	on,	what	they	intend	and	what	they	feel”	(Gallagher,	2005,	p.	204).	Unlike	the	TT	and	ST,	which	focus	on	the	internal	mental	states	of	the	subject,	this	account	emphasizes	the	importance	of	informational	sensitivity	and	appropriate	responsiveness	to	specific	features	of	one’s	environment	and	others’	bodily	cues.	On	this	view,	social	cognition	is	underwritten	by	a	subtle	interactive	dance	of	physical	cues	that	we	each	exhibit	and	detect.		Secondary	intersubjectivity	comes	online	around	age	1,	and	it	is	marked	by	a	move	from	one-on-one,	immediate	intersubjectivity	to	contexts	of	shared	attention.	“The	defining	feature	of	secondary	intersubjectivity	is	that	an	object	or	event	can	become	a	focus	between	people.	Objects	and	events	can	be	communicated	about…	the	infant’s	interactions	with	another	person	begin	to	have	reference	to	the	things	that	surround	them”	(Gallagher,	2005,	p.	207).	At	this	stage,	the	child	learns	to	follow	gazes,	point,	and	communicate	with	others	about	objects	of	shared	attention.	Just	as	primary	intersubjectivity	concerns	sensitivity	to	others’	bodily	cues	as	opposed	to	a	subject’s	internal	mental	representations,	secondary	intersubjectivity	focuses	on	the	dynamic	interaction	between	subjects	about	an	object	of	shared	attention	rather	than	an	individual’s	internal	mental	representations.			Embodied	cognition	theorists	hold	that	even	as	adults,	primary	and	secondary	intersubjectivity	underwrite	most	of	our	social	interactions.	As	adults	we	can,	of	course,	represent	others’	mental	states,	but	they	argue	it	is	a	rare,	specialized	skill	that	we	employ	only	when	basic,	more	common	interactive	skills	break	down.	Thus,	according	to	this	view,	an	accurate	depiction	of	our	ordinary	social	interactions	focuses	less	on	individuals’	mental	representations	and	more	on	these	interactive	embodied	practices.		
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Proponents	of	embedded,	embodied,	extended,	and	enactive	cognition	offer	a	wide	range	of	arguments	with	more	or	less	revolutionary	conclusions.	Some	theorists	seem	to	be	offering	a	helpful	corrective	to	cognitivism,	whereas	others	advocate	tossing	out	cognitivism	altogether.	I	do	not	think	that	the	arguments	or	evidence	from	collectivists	warrant	repealing	and	replacing	the	mainstream	views	in	social	cognition.	I	have	argued	extensively	against	the	most	radical	embodied	cognition	challenges	to	cognitivist	approaches	to	social	cognition	(Spaulding,	2010,	2011,	2013,	2015).	I	will	not	rehash	those	arguments	here.	Rather	I	shall	simply	note	that	I	find	embodied	cognition’s	arguments	for	a	social	cognition	revolution	unpersuasive,	and	these	arguments	are	relatively	moderate	in	comparison	to	arguments	stemming	from	extended	cognition	and	enactivism.	The	latter	views	maintain	that	dynamic	interactions	(between	an	agent	and	her	environment,	an	agent	and	another	agent,	things	in	the	environment)	somehow	constitute	a	cognitive	process.	I	do	not	think	that	proponents	of	these	views	have	sufficiently	rebutted	the	basic	objection	that	they	conflate	causal	coupling	with	constitution,	nor	have	they	provided	good	reasons	to	think	that	cognitive	science	would	be	better	off	with	collectivist	accounts	replacing	individualistic	accounts.	Thus,	I	do	not	find	the	revolutionary	conclusions	at	all	persuasive.			Nevertheless,	there	is	something	important	to	be	gleaned	from	collectivist	challenges.	Collectivists	are	right	that	individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition	focus	too	much	on	the	mental	representations	in	a	subject’s	mind.	A	subject’s	mental	representations	are	an	important,	essential	part	of	the	explanation	of	how	we	think	and	act	together,	of	course.	But	individualistic	accounts	tend	to	neglect	aspects	of	social	cognition	that	are	not	represented	in	the	subject’s	mind,	e.g.,	the	role	of	situational	context	in	our	social	interactions.	In	the	next	section,	I	shall	describe	how	the	situational	context	influences	in-group/out-group	dynamics,	the	interpretations	that	are	salient	to	us,	and	our	own	emotions,	thoughts,	and	behaviors.	These	effects,	though	not	emphasized	by	collectivist	accounts	of	social	cognition,	are	collectivist	in	spirit.	I	discuss	them	as	friendly	amendments	to	individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition.			
3.	Situational	Context		Imagine	that	you	are	at	your	university’s	library	on	a	weekday	during	the	semester.	The	place	is	abuzz	with	muted	activity.	Students	are	reading,	listening	to	music	through	headphones,	working	on	their	computers,	and	chatting	in	hushed	tones.	Some	clearly	are	studying,	while	others	clearly	are	not.	In	this	context,	certain	behaviors	are	expectable,	e.g.,	reading	library	books,	writing	a	paper,	and	doing	math	homework.	Other	behaviors	would	be	surprising	in	this	context,	e.g.,	shouting,	playing	beer	pong,	and	loudly	singing	the	university’s	fight	song.		Now	imagine	that	you	are	at	a	football	game	on	your	university’s	campus.	Thousands	of	people,	both	young	and	old,	are	milling	about	inside	and	outside	the	stadium.	People	are	playing	catch,	drinking	beer,	socializing,	and	watching	the	
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football	game.	In	this	context,	shouting,	playing	beer	pong,	and	loudly	singing	the	university’s	fight	song	are	completely	unsurprising.	These	are	just	the	sorts	of	behaviors	you	would	expect	at	a	football	game.	In	contrast,	you	would	be	very	surprised	to	see	someone	reading	a	library	book,	writing	a	paper,	or	doing	math	homework	at	a	football	game.	The	situational	context	guides	your	expectations	for	a	social	interaction.	What	is	normal	and	expectable	in	the	library	is	surprising,	perhaps	even	bizarre,	at	the	football	game,	and	vice	versa.			The	influence	of	the	situation	on	social	cognition	usually	is	opaque	to	subjects	in	the	situation.	Instead	of	reflecting	on	the	fact	that	you	are	at	the	library	or	football	game,	you	tend	to	simply	act,	interpret,	and	respond	to	others	in	ways	that	you	assume	to	be	appropriate	in	these	situations.	Thus,	you	often	do	not	mentally	represent	the	situational	context	or	its	effects	on	your	social	interpretations	and	interactions.	Because	individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition	focus	on	individual	subjects’	mental	representations,	they	neglect	aspects	of	social	cognition	that	are	not	mentally	represented,	like	the	situational	context.	This	is	unfortunate	in	this	case	because	the	situational	context	turns	out	to	be	hugely	influential	in	how	we	understand	and	interact	with	other	people.	I	describe	some	of	these	influences	in	this	section.		
3.1	In-group	and	Out-group	Dynamics	
	Social	interactions	are	deeply	influenced	by	in-group	and	out-group	dynamics.	We	habitually	and	rapidly	identify	people	either	as	part	of	our	in-group	or	as	part	of	an	out-group	(Tajfel,	1974).	In-grouping	and	out-grouping	appear	to	be	a	function	of	perceived	similarity	(Ames,	2004a,	2004b).	That	is,	those	who	we	perceive	to	be	like	us	in	some	relevant	respect	are	categorized	as	part	of	our	in-group,	and	those	who	we	perceive	to	be	unlike	us	in	the	relevant	respect	are	categorized	as	part	of	an	out-group.			In	heterogeneous	societies,	age,	race,	and	gender	often	are	salient	features	of	people,	and	thus	one	tends	to	identify	people	who	share	one’s	age,	race,	or	gender	as	part	of	one’s	in-group.	Although	these	are	reliable	dimensions	of	in-grouping,	social	categorization	extends	beyond	these	classifications.	People	have	multiple,	overlapping	identities,	and	perceived	similarity	is	relative	to	a	context.	Who	counts	as	part	of	one’s	in-group	varies	depending	on	the	situational	context.			Consider	again	the	library	and	the	football	game.	In	the	context	of	the	library,	certain	features	may	be	salient	you,	e.g.,	class	affiliation.	In	that	case,	you	consider	as	part	of	your	in-group	people	who	are	enrolled	in	your	class	and	perhaps	can	help	you	study,	and	everyone	else	is	considered	the	out-group.	Now	contrast	this	to	the	context	of	the	football	game.	At	the	game,	people	associated	with	the	home-team	are	part	of	your	in-group,	and	the	people	associated	with	the	visiting	team	are	part	of	the	out-group.	In	this	situation,	the	salient	criterion	of	similarity	is	team	allegiance	–	often	marked	by	clothing	color	–	and	so	you	regard	all	of	the	people	wearing	certain	colors,	cheering	for	the	home	team	as	part	of	your	in-group.		
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	The	important	point	to	grasp	is	that	in-groups	and	out-groups	are	not	fixed.	Rather,	they	are	contextually	relative.	You	may	perceive	people	to	be	similar	to	you	in	one	situational	context	but	not	another.	Thus,	someone	you	regard	as	part	of	the	out-group	in	the	library	you	may	regard	as	part	of	the	in-group	at	the	football	game.	The	situational	context	determines	what	is	salient	and	therefore	the	dimensions	along	which	you	classify	people	as	part	of	your	in-group	or	part	of	an	out-group.			These	findings	are	important	in	this	discussion	about	how	we	think	and	act	together	because	we	treat	in-group	members	quite	differently	from	out-group	members.	We	usually	have	more	favorable	attitudes	toward	and	empathize	more	with	in-group	members,	especially	people	who	share	our	gender,	race,	age,	religion,	or	nationality	than	toward	people	do	not	share	these	features	(Rudman,	Greenwald,	Mellott,	&	Schwartz,	1999).	These	social	categories	reliably	generate	in-group	favoritism,	as	do	more	explicit	social	groups,	such	as	teams,	universities,	and	professions.	Indeed,	experimenters	can	elicit	in-group	favoritism	even	for	very	minimal,	arbitrary	groups	(Ashburn-Nardo,	Voils,	&	Monteith,	2001).	By	making	idiosyncratic	features	artificially	salient,	e.g.,	eye	color,	first	letter	of	one’s	surname,	or	even	randomly	assigned	groups,	subjects	will	prefer	individuals	who	happen	to	share	the	arbitrary,	idiosyncratic	feature.			We	like	and	therefore	more	charitably	interpret	in-group	members	simply	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	we	perceive	them	to	be	like	us	in	some	salient	respect.	The	effects	of	in-group	favoritism	are	especially	strong	in	a	context	of	competition	or	threat	(Cikara,	Bruneau,	Van	Bavel,	&	Saxe,	2014).	In	those	contexts,	we	will	like	and	be	even	more	charitable	toward	in-group	members	and	dislike	and	be	even	less	charitable	toward	members	of	out-groups.	Moreover,	in	categorizing	individuals	into	in-groups	and	out-groups,	we	gloss	over	differences	within	the	groups	and	exaggerate	differences	between	the	groups	(Linville,	Fischer,	&	Salovey,	1989;	Mullen	&	Hu,	1989).	Thus,	in	the	context	of	the	football	game,	you	will	tend	to	exaggerate	the	differences	between	the	visiting	team	and	the	home	team,	like	and	more	charitably	interpret	the	behavior	of	the	home	team,	and	dislike	and	uncharitably	interpret	the	behavior	of	the	visiting	team.3	The	same	patterns	apply	to	your	reasoning	about	home	team	fans	and	visiting	team	fans,	as	well.		In	the	context	of	sports,	these	patterns	seem	innocuous	enough.	But	in	interactions	where	more	is	at	stake	than	just	a	sporting	event	victory,	the	effects	can	be	quite																																																									3	In	a	foundational	study	on	this	topic,	Hastorf	and	Cantril	(1954)	found	that	students	from	rival	universities	interpreted	a	video	of	a	football	game	between	the	rivals	dramatically	differently.	Disagreements	emerged	over	whether	the	game	was	played	fairly,	which	team	played	dirty,	whether	particular	penalties	were	justified,	whether	a	non-call	was	justified,	the	proportion	of	infractions	made	by	the	other	team,	etc.	As	any	sports	fan	knows,	one’s	allegiance	to	a	team	colors	one’s	interpretation	of	what	happens	in	the	game.	This	is	one	reason	why	media	outlets	now	offer	“team	stream”	programming,	curated	and	narrated	by	fans	of	your	team.	
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serious.	Think	of	political	debates	about	same-sex	marriage,	welfare	benefits,	the	refugee	crisis,	etc.	In	these	cases,	perceived	similarity	to	people	on	one	side	of	the	debate,	especially	in	a	context	of	threat	or	competition	for	resources,	generates	in-group	favoritism	with	very	serious	consequences.	In	such	cases,	we	regard	in-group	members	as	more	human,	in	a	sense,	than	out-group	members	(Hackel,	Looser,	&	Van	Bavel,	2014).	We	regard	in-group	members	as	more	capable	of	experiencing	secondary	emotions	(such	as	pride	and	guilt)	and	as	having	richer,	more	complex	mental	experiences	than	out-group	members	(Haslam,	2006).	We	tend	to	attribute	more	simplistic,	caricatured	mental	states	to	those	we	perceive	to	be	unlike	us.	At	the	extreme,	people	tend	to	dehumanize	those	individuals	who	are	perceived	to	be	least	like	them,	e.g.,	the	homeless	and	drug	addicts	(L.	T.	Harris	&	Fiske,	2006).	In	these	cases,	we	tend	not	to	attribute	mental	states	to	such	people	at	all,	treating	them	more	like	animals	or	even	objects	than	fellow	humans.		In-group/out-group	identification	also	affects	how	we	interpret	others’	behavior	and	mental	states.	For	example,	when	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	similar	to	us	in	some	salient	respect,	we	often	simply	project	our	own	mental	states	to	that	individual	(Ames,	2004a,	2004b).	We	also	use	our	mental	states	as	an	anchor	and	adjust	the	interpretation	based	on	how	similar	the	individual	is	to	us.	These	egocentric	heuristics	make	interactions	between	in-group	members	easier	and	smoother	than	interactions	with	out-group	members.4	In	these	cases,	we	find	it	easier	to	think	and	act	with	other	people.			When	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	different	from	us,	we	tend	to	take	a	different	approach.	Often	we	use	stereotypes	about	the	individual’s	salient	in-group	(Ames,	2004a;	Krueger,	1998;	Vorauer,	Hunter,	Main,	&	Roy,	2000).	Stereotypes	may	be	positive,	negative,	or	neutral	beliefs	about	some	group.	Reliance	on	stereotypes	is	a	shortcut	that	reduces	cognitive	load,	and	once	the	stereotype	is	activated,	processing	stereotype-consistent	information	is	less	cognitively	demanding	than	processing	stereotype-inconsistent	information.	Thus,	especially	when	subjects	are	under	cognitive	load,	they	will	employ	a	stereotype	and	attend	to	stereotype-inconsistent	information	only	if	it	is	highly	salient	(Gilbert	&	Hixon,	1991).		Putting	all	of	this	together,	the	situational	context	frames	our	social	interactions,	e.g.,	as	one	of	competition	or	collaboration.	The	situational	context	makes	certain	features	salient	to	us,	e.g.,	team	allegiance	or	class	affiliation.	On	the	basis	of	these	salient	features,	we	perceive	others	as	part	of	an	in-group	or	an	out-group.	In-group/out-group	status	significantly	affects	how	much	we	like	and	charitably	interpret	others,	and	thus	how	smoothly	the	interaction	proceeds.	It	affects	the	strategies	we	use	to	interpret	others	behavior,	e.g.,	projection	or	stereotyping.	And	it																																																									4	When	these	egocentric	heuristics	go	awry,	they	generate	the	“curse	of	knowledge,”	a	phenomenon	wherein	we	falsely	assume	that	others	know	what	we	know,	and	the	“false	consensus	effect,”	which	occurs	when	we	falsely	assume	that	others	share	our	opinion	on	some	matter	(Clement	&	Krueger,	2002;	Epley	&	Waytz,	2010,	p.	512).			
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even	affects	whether	we	attribute	mental	states	to	someone	perceived	to	be	very	unlike	us.			Individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition	focus	on	the	front-end	product	–	mental	representation	of	others’	mental	states.	But	unless	you	consider	the	ways	in	which	the	situational	context	influences	in-group/out-group	dynamics,	you	cannot	fully	understand	how	we	come	to	have	these	particular	mental	representations.	Thus,	a	more	complete	account	of	social	cognition	must	recognize	the	role	of	situational	context	in	social	cognition	and	interaction.			
3.2	Expectations	and	Interpretations		As	adults,	we	rarely	are	completely	clueless	about	what	to	expect	in	a	social	interaction.	In	most	cases,	we	have	some	expectations	about	how	the	interaction	will	go,	even	if	those	expectations	turn	out	to	be	violated.	The	situational	context	and	our	past	experiences	are	the	source	of	our	expectations	about	what	will	happen	in	social	interactions.	As	we	saw	in	our	university	themed	examples	above,	at	the	library	we	expect	to	see	students	reading,	writing,	and	doing	homework,	and	at	the	football	game	we	expect	to	see	people	cheering,	playing	games,	etc.	We	have	these	expectations	based	on	the	context	and	our	knowledge	about	such	environments.			This	banal	fact	about	our	expectations	in	social	interactions	is	related	to	a	more	interesting	fact	about	our	interpretations	of	social	interactions.	Our	interpretations	of	what	happens	in	a	social	interaction	are	shaped	of	course	by	what	we	see,	but	also	by	what	we	expect	to	see.	When	you	are	at	the	library	you	tend	to	interpret	social	interactions	to	be	in	line	with	what	you	know	about	university	libraries,	e.g.,	the	kind	of	people	who	go	to	libraries	and	the	social	norms	of	libraries.	So	long	as	behavior	does	not	overtly	thwart	the	norms	of	the	library,	you	will	interpret	observed	behavior	in	terms	of	what	you	expect	to	see	in	that	context.			These	facts	imply	that	the	very	same	behavior	in	one	situational	context	may	be	interpreted	radically	differently	in	another	situational	context	(Gilbert	&	Hixon,	1991;	Trope,	1986).	For	example,	keeping	one’s	distance	and	limiting	eye	contact	on	public	transportation	is	normal	behavior,	but	doing	this	at	a	party	would	be	rude	and	anti-social.	The	situational	context	influences	spontaneous	personality	trait	inferences,	as	well.	We	may	infer	that	the	eye-contact-avoiding	partygoer	is	awkward	or	rude,	but	in	a	different	context	the	very	same	behavior	would	lead	us	to	a	different	inference.			In	general,	the	situational	context	makes	certain	interpretations	more	accessible,	i.e.,	our	attention	is	primed	for	these	interpretations	(Wittenbrink,	Judd,	&	Park,	2001).	These	interpretations	will	be	more	salient	to	us	than	otherwise	plausible	but	unconsidered	interpretations.	As	particular	situations	become	more	familiar	to	us,	the	interpretation	of	those	situations	will	become	more	accessible	and	more	difficult	to	override	(Higgins,	King,	&	Mavin,	1982).	The	tendency	to	habitually	code	
	 10	
situations	and	others’	behavior	in	a	particular	way	can	become	proceduralized.	Well-practiced	judgments	make	social	interpretation	easier,	more	efficient,	and	more	predictable,	but	they	preempt	equally	reasonable	but	less	practiced	judgments	(Smith,	1990).			The	examples	used	to	illustrate	the	foregoing	discussion	are	innocuous	enough,	but	it	is	not	hard	to	see	how	the	situational	context’s	influence	on	our	expectations	and	interpretations	can	have	pernicious	effects.	Think	about	the	Trayvon	Martin	case,	where	a	self-appointed	neighborhood	watchman	shot	and	killed	Martin,	a	black	teenage	boy	who	was	wearing	a	hoodie	and	eating	Skittles	while	walking	through	his	neighborhood	at	night.	Or	consider	the	case	of	Tamir	Rice,	a	12-year-old	black	boy	who	was	playing	with	a	toy	gun	in	a	park	in	broad	daylight	and	was	shot	and	killed	by	police	within	seconds	of	their	arrival	at	the	scene.	In	these	and	many	other	cases,	it	is	not	hard	to	see	how	the	shooters’	past	experiences	and	situational	context	shaped	their	expectations	and	interpretations	of	the	situations,	to	tragic	consequences.	In	both	cases,	reasonable,	benign,	true	interpretations	of	Martin	and	Rice’s	behavior	were	possible.	It	is	hard	to	know	the	psychology	of	the	shooters,	but	a	plausible	hypothesis	is	that	they	so	frequently	interpreted	young	black	men	(and	children,	apparently)	as	dangerous	that	this	tendency	became	proceduralized,	and	they	did	not	even	consider	plausible	alternative	interpretations.	Again,	this	is	speculation	about	the	psychology	of	individual	people,	but	it	is	one	that	seems	imminently	plausible	in	light	of	what	cognitive	and	social	psychology	tell	us	about	how	situational	context	and	habits	influence	our	expectations	and	interpretations	of	social	interactions.		Returning	to	the	issue	of	individualism	and	collectivism,	recall	that	individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition	focus	on	a	subject’s	mental	representations	in	social	interactions.	From	the	first	person	perspective,	it	is	opaque	to	us	how	the	situational	context	and	our	habits	shape	our	expectations	and	interpretations	of	social	interactions.	In	the	process	of	interpreting	a	social	interaction,	it	seems	to	us	that	certain	expectations	and	interpretations	just	occur	to	us	unbidden.	Of	course	we	can	and	sometimes	should	deliberate	carefully	in	search	of	alternative	interpretations,	but	the	relevant	point	here	is	that	we	as	interpreters	do	not	mentally	represent	how	the	situation	influences	our	expectations	and	interpretations.	As	a	result,	individualistic	accounts	focused	on	mental	representations	neglect	the	important	role	of	the	situational	context	in	generating	the	mental	representations	we	end	up	having.			
3.3	Priming	Effects	
	As	I	discussed	in	3.1	and	3.2,	the	situational	context	influences	in-group/out-group	dynamics	and	our	expectations	and	interpretations	in	social	interactions.	In	addition	to	these	dramatic	effects	on	social	cognition,	the	situational	context	also	includes	subtle	cues	in	the	environment	that	can	affect	our	interpretation	of	the	social	interaction.	These	are	priming	effects,	and	they	influence	our	emotional,	cognitive,	and	possibly	behavioral	responses	in	social	situations	(Bargh,	Chen,	&	Burrows,	
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1996;	DeCoster	&	Claypool,	2004;	Fiske	&	Taylor,	2013,	pp.	32-37).	Subliminal	priming	occurs	when	a	stimulus	is	presented	to	subjects	too	quickly	to	be	consciously	processed.	Conscious	priming	occurs	when	the	subject	consciously	perceives	the	prime	but	has	no	awareness	of	its	effects	on	subsequent	reactions.			There	is	robust	evidence	for	affective	priming.	When	negative	stimuli,	e.g.,	angry	faces	or	emotionally	arousing	words,	are	presented	either	subliminally	or	consciously,	this	influences	subjects’	facial	expressions,	mood,	and	affective	responses	to	stimuli	that	are	unrelated	to	the	primed	stimuli.	In	other	words,	if	primed	with	negative	stimuli	(e.g.,	frowning	faces),	one’s	responses	to	neutral	stimuli	(e.g.,	Chinese	ideographs)	will	be	more	negative	than	if	one	were	not	primed	with	negative	stimuli	(Murphy,	Monahan,	&	Zajonc,	1995).	Affective	priming	also	works	when	subjects	are	primed	with	positive	stimuli	(Monahan,	Murphy,	&	Zajonc,	2000).	These	data	suggest	that	subtle	affective	cues	in	the	environment	influence	one’s	own	affective	state.	Furthermore,	one’s	affective	state	influences	one’s	social	interpretations.	Our	judgments	about	other	people	tend	to	correlate	with	our	own	mood.	For	example,	when	we	are	in	a	positive	mood,	we	form	more	favorable	impressions	than	when	we	are	in	a	negative	mood	(Forgas	&	Bower,	1987).	Thus,	processing	subtle	negative	or	positive	stimuli	in	the	environment	alters	our	own	affective	states,	which	biases	our	social	interpretations	and	interactions	with	others.			In	addition	to	affective	priming,	many	studies	also	find	evidence	of	cognitive	priming,	which	occurs	when	subtle	cues	in	the	environment	activate	concepts	and	influence	subjects’	judgments.	For	example,	Kawakami,	Dovidio,	and	Dijksterhuis	(2003)	found	that	subjects	primed	either	subliminally	or	consciously	with	words	related	to	the	elderly	expressed	more	conservative	attitudes	than	those	not	primed	with	elderly-related	words,	and	subjects	primed	with	the	skinhead	category	expressed	more	prejudicial	attitudes.	With	respect	to	social	cognition,	Graham	and	Lowery	(2004)	found	that	police	officers	and	juvenile	probation	officers	subliminally	primed	with	words	related	to	the	racial	category	black	were	more	likely	to	interpret	a	hypothetical	adolescent	(whose	race	is	unspecified)	as	having	a	worse	personality,	being	more	blameworthy,	more	likely	to	reoffend,	and	they	recommended	harsher	punishments.	In	this	case,	activating	the	racial	category	black	(in	subjects	who	seem	to	have	underlying	racial	biases)	affected	their	judgments	about	a	hypothetical	offender	whose	race	is	unspecified.	In	general,	the	situational	context	can	activate	subjects’	concepts,	which	makes	certain	judgments	and	interpretations	more	salient	to	subjects.			Finally,	there	is	evidence	that	primed	stimuli	can	influence	not	just	how	we	feel	and	think	but	also	how	we	behave.	The	data	for	behavioral	priming	are	mixed	and	complicated,	but	some	studies	suggest	that	primed	stimuli	can	influence	our	behavior.	For	example,	in	a	set	of	now	famous	studies,	Bargh	et	al.	(1996)	found	that	after	subliminal	exposure	to	African	American	faces,	subjects	reacted	to	an	annoying	task	request	with	increased	irritability,	hostility,	anger,	and	uncooperativeness	(as	rated	by	the	experimenter).	In	the	same	article,	Bargh	and	colleagues	report	that	priming	subjects	with	words	associated	with	the	elderly	influenced	how	slowly	they	
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walked,	and	priming	subjects	with	rude	words	influenced	how	quickly	and	frequently	they	interrupted	the	experimenters.		Though	many	studies	–	far	too	many	to	review	here	–	have	found	evidence	of	priming	effects,	we	should	be	cautious.	There	has	been	significant	controversy	over	the	failure	to	replicate	behavioral	priming	studies,	such	as	the	ones	described	above	(C.	R.	Harris,	Coburn,	Rohrer,	&	Pashler,	2013;	Yong,	2012).	The	difficulty	in	replicating	priming	effects	does	not	imply	that	behavioral	priming	never	occurs.	After	all,	priming	effects	depend	on	subtle	factors	that	may	be	difficult	to	replicate.5	But	we	should	be	careful	about	what	we	conclude	from	these	studies.	On	the	one	hand,	these	considerations	suggest	that	it	is	not	so	problematic	that	some	behavioral	priming	studies	have	not	been	replicated.	On	the	other	hand,	given	how	sensitive	to	context	such	effects	are,	we	may	not	be	able	to	generalize	from	these	behavioral	priming	studies	to	predictions	about	how	individuals	will	behave	in	different	situations.6			Summing	up,	although	there	may	be	reason	to	withhold	judgment	on	the	robustness	and	generalizability	of	studies	on	behavioral	priming	effects,	there	is	substantial	evidence	for	affective	and	cognitive	priming.	Even	if	subtle	cues	in	the	environment	do	not	reliably	directly	influence	behavior,	these	cues	will	indirectly	affect	behavior	by	influencing	our	emotions	and	cognition.	How	we	feel	and	think	about	others	in	social	interactions	certainly	has	an	effect	on	how	we	interact	with	others.			Mainstream	individualistic	views	in	the	social	cognition	literature	tend	not	to	focus	much	on	priming	effects.7	Though	priming	effects	may	be	less	dramatic	than	the	effects	of	situational	context	on	in-group/out-group	dynamics	and	our	expectations	and	interpretations,	they	are	nonetheless	important.	Priming	effects	demonstrate	that	we	do	not	observe	and	interpret	others’	behavior	in	a	vacuum.	How	we	think	and	act	with	other	people	is	shaped	by	subtle	cues	in	the	environment.	Broadening																																																									5	Replication	studies	may	be	direct	or	conceptual.	Direct	replications	try	to	reproduce	exactly	the	same	result	using	exactly	the	same	methods	as	the	original	study.	Direct	replications	are	difficult,	especially	when	the	effects	depend	on	subtle	factors.	Even	when	researchers	are	fully	forthcoming	about	the	methods	of	the	original	study,	it	may	be	difficult	to	replicate	exactly	the	same	methods.	In	contrast,	conceptual	replications	try	to	test	the	experiment’s	underlying	hypothesis	by	using	different	methods.	The	trouble	with	conceptual	replication	of	priming	studies	is	that	priming	effects	are	highly	sensitive	to	variations	in	the	features	of	the	experiment	and	the	pool	of	subjects.	Thus,	it	may	be	difficult	to	get	the	same	results	with	different	methodology	and	different	subjects.	Failure	to	conceptually	replicate	priming	studies	does	not	imply	that	there	is	no	priming	effect.		6	See	De	Houwer,	Teige-Mocigemba,	Spruyt,	and	Moors	(2009)	for	an	analysis	and	review	of	the	literature	on	implicit	measures	and	priming	effects.	7	One	exception	here	is	Goldman.	Though	he	does	not	focus	on	these	effects,	he	briefly	suggests	that	priming	effects	may	be	the	result	of	covert	mental	simulation	involving	primed	stimuli	(Goldman,	2006,	pp.	161-162).	
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our	focus	beyond	an	individual’s	mental	representations	and	thinking	of	social	cognition	and	interaction	more	like	a	collectivist	opens	our	eyes	to	the	effects	of	the	environment	on	how	we	think	and	act	together.			
4.	Conclusion		Individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition	primarily	focus	on	individual	subjects’	mental	representations	in	thinking	about	and	interacting	with	other	people.	These	accounts	implicitly	sterilize	the	environments	in	which	we	think	and	act	with	other	people.	They	presuppose	that	situational	contexts	are	neutral	and	do	not	significantly	influence	social	cognition	and	interaction.	In	contrast,	collectivist	accounts	focus	on	these	environments,	sometimes	to	the	exclusion	of	an	individual	subject’s	mental	representations.	Although	I	reject	the	most	radical	collectivist	claims,	individualistic	accounts	can	benefit	from	considering	some	phenomena	that	are	more	collectivist	in	spirit.			In	this	paper,	I	examined	how	our	environments	shape	our	social	thoughts	and	actions.	In	particular,	I	argued	that	the	situational	context	makes	certain	features	of	individuals	salient	to	us.	We	use	these	features	to	demarcate	in-groups	and	out-groups,	and	in-grouping	and	out-grouping	significantly	affect	how	we	interpret	others’	behavior.	The	situational	context	also	influences	our	expectations	and	interpretations	in	particular	environments.	The	effects	of	this	can	be	quite	dramatic	in	some	situations,	as	I	explored	in	discussing	the	cases	of	Trayvon	Martin	and	Tamir	Rice.	Finally,	I	argued	that	the	situational	context	includes	subtle	cues	that	prime	our	own	emotions,	concepts,	and	behavior.	Stimuli	in	the	environment	seem	to	affect	how	we	feel,	think,	and	act	in	ways	that	are	opaque	to	introspection.		In	all	three	of	these	cases,	the	situational	context	shapes	the	mental	representations	we	have	in	social	interactions.	Focusing	only	on	the	end	product	–	the	mental	representations	we	happen	to	have	–	neglects	a	crucial	part	of	story	of	how	we	think	and	act	together.	In	particular,	it	leaves	unexplained	why	we	have	these	particular	mental	representations.	The	phenomena	I	have	discussed	here	shed	light	on	how	the	situational	context	shapes	the	mental	representations	we	have	in	various	situations.	Thus,	these	phenomena	are	important	for	individualistic	accounts	that	aim	to	give	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	social	cognition	and	interaction.				
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